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  The determinants of the precision of the management forecast are important but largely 
unexplored by prior studies. Using a larger sample of more recent management earnings 
forecasts than used in prior work, we provide strong evidence that bad news forecasts are less 
precise than are good news forecasts. In addition, we examine the association between 
management forecast precision and forecast surprise (i.e., the difference between the 
management earnings forecast and the market’s extant expectations for future earnings), and 
between management forecast precision and expected forecast error (i.e., the expected accuracy 
of the forecast, or the difference between the management earnings forecast and management’s 
expectations for future earnings). We find that the forecast precision is negatively associated 
with both forecast surprise and forecast error. Furthermore, we document that the negative 
association is stronger when the forecast is bad news (i.e., when the forecast is in short of extant 
market’s expectation) than when it is good news, and when the forecast has negative forecast 
error (i.e., when forecast exceeds the actual ex post earnings) than when it has positive forecast 
error, due to greater legal liability concern related to bad news forecasts and negative forecast 
errors, respectively. Thus, this study enables us to better understand management’s voluntary 




Exploring the Role that Forecast Surprise and Forecast Error Play  




  The practice of earnings guidance, and in particular, management forecasts of earnings, 
has grown significantly since The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) was passed 
by Congress in 1995. Management forecasts are voluntary disclosures and are the result of 
management making decisions, an important one of which relates to the form, specificity, or 
precision of the forecast (e.g., point estimate, range, minimum or maximum, or other qualitative 
statement). However, the precision and other characteristics of the management forecasts have 
rarely investigated in prior research (Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2004).
1 In this study, we 
model the determinants of this decision, focusing on the incentives underlying management’s 
choice of forecast precision. Understanding how these incentives relate to management’s choice 
of forecast precision is important because this can provide investors and other users with cues 
about the characteristics of the information contained in the forecasts. Moreover, an analysis of 
forecast precision and the motives behind the choices made by management may allow Congress 
to better evaluate policies related to voluntary management disclosures. 
We examine, in this study, the association between management forecast precision and 
forecast surprise (i.e., the difference between the management earnings forecast and the market’s 
extant expectations for future earnings), and between management forecast precision and 
expected forecast error (i.e., the expected accuracy of the forecast, or the difference between the 
                                                 
1 Baginski et al. (2004) argued that the incentive that managers deliberately choose forecast characteristics had not 
been extensively studied. Furthermore, Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2006) state that “it is striking that the 
decision managers make about forecast characteristics are not well understood. Explicitly studying this element of 
managerial choice is important because it further enhances our knowledge of management earnings forecasts.”  
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management earnings forecast and management’s expectations for future earnings). A small 
body of the extant accounting literature investigates the determinants of management forecast 
precision. This literature posits that managers have incentives to disclose forecasts with different 
levels of precision, and documents that forecast precision varies as expected with certain firm 
characteristics. Specifically, Baginski and Hassell (1997) find that forecast precision is 
increasing in private information (as proxied by analyst following) and decreasing in public 
information (as proxied by firm size). Furthermore, Bamber and Cheon (1998) find that forecast 
precision is lower for firms operating in more concentrated product markets and for forecasts 
released via press release (vs. via meeting with analyst and reporters), and that forecast precision 
has increased over time. Finally, both sets of authors find that management forecasts are less 
precise the longer the forecast horizon.   
Some theoretical research examines the role of precision in disclosures to the market. For 
example, Kim and Verrecchia (1991, 2001) and Subramanyam (1996) suggest that the precision 
of a disclosure influences the magnitude of belief revision, which in turn influences the 
magnitude of the market’s reaction to the disclosure. However, empirical tests provide mixed 
evidence on the association between stock returns and forecast precision (Baginski, Conrad, and 
Hassell 1993, Pownell, Wasley, and Waymire 1993, Atiase, Li, Supattarakul, and Tse 2005).
2
Other empirical research first focuses on the association between forecast precision and 
the sign of the forecast surprise. Here, precision is expected to differ when the management 
forecast exceeds extant market expectations (i.e., it is a “good news” forecast) versus when the 
 
2 Specifically, although Pownell et al. (1993) and Atiase et al. (2005) do not find a significant relationship between 
forecast precision and the magnitude of the market’s reaction to the forecast, Baginski et al. (1993) find that the 
precision of management forecasts affects the market’s reaction to the forecast surprise. In contrast, experimental 
studies by Libby, Tan, and Hunton (2006) and Han and Tan (2006) report that the market’s reaction is influenced by 
forecast precision.  
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extant market expectations exceed the management forecast (i.e., it is a “bad news” forecast). 
These studies hypothesize that bad news management forecasts should be less precise than good 
news forecasts to dampen the adverse market reaction (Skinner 1994, Baginski and Hassell 1997, 
Hughes and Pae 2004) or to decrease legal liability that could result if market participants found 
(more precise) forecasts to be misleading (Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper 1994, Bamber and 
Cheon 1998).
3 However, prior studies document, at best, a marginal association between the sign 
of the news and forecast precision. For example, Baginski and Hassell (1997) use the sign of the 
stock price reaction measured over the three days surrounding the management forecast to 
classify the news as good or bad, and find no significant association between the sign of the 
stock price reaction and forecast precision. Alternatively, Bamber and Cheon (1998) characterize 
good versus bad news based on whether the management forecast exceeds extant analysts’ 
forecasts and on the sign of the stock price reaction to the forecast. They find weak evidence that 
bad news forecasts are less precise; but this result is not significant when they control for the 
multiple observations per sample firm. We extend this literature by examining the association 
between both the sign and the magnitude of forecast surprise and forecast error, and forecast 
precision.  
Following prior research (Bamber and Cheon 1998, Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995, 
Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther 2000, Field, Lowry, and Shu 2005), we expect managers have 
incentives to issue forecasts to decrease legal liability. If managers do not disclose material 
information on a timely basis, investors could have a basis for lawsuits. However, the issuance of 
management forecasts, per se, does not necessarily decrease legal liability (Francis et al. 1994, 
 
3 Alternatively, Baginski and Hassell (1997) suggest that bad news forecasts may be more precise than good news 
forecasts because managers may have incentives to communicate precise information to avoid legal liability for 
withholding bad news.   
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Healey and Palepu 2001). Rather, the issuance of management forecasts could increase legal 
liability in two ways. First, if managers issue forecasts containing a surprising news (i.e., greater 
forecast surprise), investors may litigate on the basis that management failed to disclose material 
information on a timely basis. Second, if the forecasted information turns out to be inaccurate 
later (i.e., a greater forecast error), investors may litigate on the basis that management disclosed 
erroneous information. Thus, given the potential legal consequences for issuing very surprising 
forecasts, we expect that managers will act strategically and, all else equal, choose forecast 
precision in order not to surprise the market too much. This managers’ incentive could result in 
issuing imprecise forecasts when managers think the forecast include very surprising news, in 
order to dampen the market’s perceived magnitude of the surprise. Similarly, given the potential 
legal consequences for issuing misleading forecasts, we expect that managers will act 
strategically and, all else equal, issue imprecise forecasts when the expected forecast error is 
larger. This results in a negative association between forecast precision and forecast surprise, and 
in a negative association between forecast precision and forecast error. Since we expect 
managers to be more concerned about a decrease in stock prices (and resultant legal liability) that 
results from the release of bad news or the news that have negative forecast errors (Skinner 1994, 
1997),
4 we expect that the negative association between forecast precision and forecast surprise 
and the negative association between forecast precision and forecast error will be stronger among 
bad news forecasts and among forecasts with negative forecast errors, respectively. 
  Using a larger sample of more recent management earnings forecasts (i.e., 16,872 firm-
year observations collected from the First Call database for the years 1995 to 2004 inclusive) 
 
4 Negative (positive) forecast error represents the case when forecast is in short of (exceeds) actual ex post earnings. 
In other words, the negative (positive) forecast error occurs when the forecast is optimistic (pessimistic).  
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than used in prior work, we provide evidence that supports our hypotheses explained above.
5 
Our inferences are consistent whether we conduct the analyses using the full sample of forecasts 
or using a restricted sample of point and range forecasts only.  In addition, our inferences are 
robust to whether we use a discrete or continuous variable for the level of forecast precision and 
different proxies to measure the magnitude of the forecast surprise.  
Little work has examined how managers choose the precision of their forecasts. As a 
result, our examination of the association between forecast surprise and forecast precision and of 
the association between forecast error and forecast precision can provide valuable insights into 
management’s disclosure strategy. Note that prior research focuses on the difference in forecast 
precision between good and bad news forecasts, and thus implicitly treats all good (and bad) 
news forecasts equally. As a result, the precision of management forecasts within good (and bad) 
news forecasts is not examined by prior research. This study fills that void and provides 
additional insights into the degree to which forecast precision varies within good (and bad) news 
forecasts depending on the magnitude of forecast surprise. 
We also contribute to the literature by studying the association between forecast precision 
and forecast error. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful for 
management to disclose excessively inaccurate forecasts. Since the forecast error (i.e., the 
difference between the management forecast and the earnings realization) cannot be known with 
certainty until actual earnings are released in the future, management likely forms some 
expectation of the uncertainty regarding the forecast error and uses this expectation when 
choosing the forecast precision. That is, managers likely consider the expected forecast error 
when choosing forecast precision. Therefore, this study enables us to better understand 
 




                                                
management’s voluntary disclosure incentives and the influence of those incentives on the 
precision of their forecasts.  
  Our results and inferences may also have important implications for policy makers. 
Although policy makers provided a “Safe Harbor Rule” in 1979 and the PSLRA in 1995 to 
protect managers and to induce them to release more forward-looking information (Hirst et al. 
2006) managers may continue to be reluctant to release this information because they fear 
litigation. At the time these policies were adopted, the primary goal of policy makers was to 
increase broad disclosures of forward-looking information. Secondarily, it was expected that 
forecast precision and accuracy would improve as managers gained experience with providing 
forward-looking information. However, even with these “Safe Harbor Rule” and PSLRA, 
managers can be expected to act strategically in order to enhance their reputations and to 
minimize forecast error (or the precision of forecast error).
6 Thus, in order to promote more 
precise disclosures in the U.S. market, policy makers may need to consider the effect of 
management incentives on their choice of forecast precision. By understanding how management 
acts strategically, policy makers may realize that the choice of forecast precision allows 
management to convey their insights regarding the probability and magnitude of the expected 
forecast error. Specifically, although some forecasts may be imprecise, allowing managers to 
select the forecast precision may allow them to convey their insights regarding their expectations 
of the eventual forecast error.   
 
6 Consistent with this, Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002) report that U.S. firms tend to release more 
imprecise, short-term forecasts and more bad news forecasts, while Canadian firms release more precise, long-term 
forecasts and more good news forecasts. They explain that their findings are consistent with higher potential legal 
liability costs of U.S. firms versus Canadian firms. Consistent with Baginski et al. (2002), the results of this study 
show that managers of firms with bad news tend to release more imprecise forecasts, presumably in an attempt to 
reduce their potential legal liability costs.    
7
 
                                                
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we discuss the prior 
literature and present our hypotheses. We describe our methodology and models in section 3, and 
present our empirical results in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
  Managers have incentives to provide forecasts of earnings or other value relevant items 
(Lang and Lundholm 1993, Skinner 1994, Botosan 1997). Once they decide to issue 
management forecasts, they need to choose the precision or type of the forecast to release (King, 
Pownall, and Waymire 1990). A point forecast (such as “earnings per share of $1.00”) provides 
the highest level of precision. A range forecast (such as “earnings per share between $0.50 and 
$1.50”) provides the next level of precision. Although the mean of the range may be viewed as 
the most probable amount, interpreting a range forecast probably involves some weighting of the 
distribution. For example, a forecast with a relatively small range (such as “earnings between 
$0.90 and $1.10”) is likely viewed as being much more precise than is a forecast with a relatively 
greater range (such as “earnings between $0.50 and $1.50”). That is, although the means of these 
two ranges are the same, the level of precision varies dramatically. Minimum forecasts (such as 
“earnings per share at least $0.50”) or maximum forecasts (such as “earnings per share at most 
$1.50”) are even less precise than are point or range forecasts.
7 Finally, the least precise form of 
a forecast consists of qualitative statements such as “earnings will be better next year.”  
 
7 In our empirical analyses, we combine minimum and maximum forecasts with other qualitative statements because 
the distinction between minimum/maximum forecasts and qualitative statements requires coder judgment. For 
example, forecasts such as “we expect loss” and “we may not meet expectations” can be interpreted as both 
maximum forecasts and qualitative statements. Our results are qualitatively similar when we consider these 
categories separately using our best judgment.  
8
 
There are two possible reasons for the relationship between forecast precision and 
forecast surprise. Managers could choose the forecast precision to decrease the magnitude of the 
market’s reaction to the disclosure and/or to decrease the legal liability with respect to the 
surprisingly large unexpected news contained in the forecasts. First, precise forecasts could have 
a greater impact on stock prices since the implications of precise forecasts are more readily 
discernable, while the market could respond less strongly to imprecise forecasts (Baginski and 
Hassell 1997, Han and Tan 2006, Libby et al. 2006). For example, on March 1, 2001, the 
Canadian Press Newswire reported. 
The practice of issuing detailed earnings forecasts has been further thrown into 
limbo with Thursday’s stock pummeling of ATI technologies, 3Com and 
Gateway Inc. – the latest in a recent wave of companies that have paid harshly for 
issuing profit warnings. …. Caution already appeared to be heightened at ATI on 
Thursday as the company gave only a general outlook for the next few quarters 
rather than detailed figures, saying it sees an “improving” outlook for the latter 
part of the year.  
 
Above example suggests that managers of ATI release imprecise forecasts to dampen the 
magnitude of the market’s reaction.  
  Most prior studies of forecast precision focus on management’s signalling incentives, 
rather than on legal liability incentives. According to the signalling view, for shorter forecast 
horizons, managers have incentives to release good news to investors; therefore, they should 
release more precise forecasts when news is good in order to ensure that the information is 
accurately conveyed to and interpreted by the investment community. Alternatively, managers 
may have incentive to release less precise bad news forecasts in order to dampen the magnitude 
of the stock price decrease (Titman and Trueman 1986; Hughes and Pae 2004). In contrast, the 
extant literature documents at best a marginal association between the sign of the news and  
9
 
                                                
forecast precision.
8 For example, Baginski and Hassell (1997) study 922 annual earnings 
forecasts and find no evidence supporting their hypothesis that bad news forecasts are less 
precise than are good news forecasts. Bamber and Cheon (1998) study a slightly larger sample 
(1,131) of forecasts and find weak evidence (one-tailed p-value = 0.10) of a negative association 
between forecast precision (‘specificity’ in their paper) and the sign of the news, but their results 
are not significant when they control for the multiple observations per sample firm. These studies 
differ from ours in that they consider relatively few forecasts
9 made during an earlier period (i.e., 
the 1980s) when management concerns regarding litigation were likely different from those 
during more recent periods. Furthermore, they compare levels of precision based solely on the 
good versus bad news dichotomy and do not consider the degree to which precision can vary 
within the two categories of news.  
In addition, given that managers also have incentives to avoid legal liability, it seems 
likely that forecast precision will vary within both good and bad news categories, depending on 
the magnitude of the forecast surprise. Kasznik and Lev (1995) and Skinner (1994) introduce the 
legal liability hypothesis that managers disclose forecasts to preempt large earnings surprises. 
According to this view, if managers fail to release important earnings news before the actual 
earnings announcements, larger earnings surprises will result and litigation, based upon the 
alleged failure of management to disclose the information on a more timely basis, could occur. 
As a result, managers have incentives to release more imprecise forecasts when the forecast 
surprise is large in order not to surprise the market too much. Extending these reasonings on the 
 
8 An exception is Skinner (1994). Studying a small sample (374) of disclosures made between 1981 and 1990 
inclusive by 93 firms listed on the NASDAQ, Skinner finds that good news disclosures are more precise than are 
bad news disclosures. 
9 The sample sizes in these studies are small because the authors had to hand collect the management forecast data.    
10
 
                                                
managers’ incentives to influence the magnitude of the market’ reaction and to avoid legal 
liability lead us to our first hypothesis (stated in alternative form). 
H1a: Forecast precision is negatively related to the forecast surprise. 
Prior studies document that bad news precipitates litigation more often than does good 
news (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995, and Bamber and Cheon 1998). Skinner (1994), 
Soffer et al. (2000), and Field et al. (2005) argue that managers release bad news forecasts to 
reduce investor surprise when earnings are announced.
10 Accordingly, managers’ incentives to 
strategically choose forecast precision depend on the magnitude and sign of the forecast surprise 
could be more strongly related to bad news disclosure than to good news disclosure. We test this 
prediction with our second hypothesis. 
H2a: The negative relationship between forecast precision and forecast surprise is  
stronger for bad news forecasts than for good news forecasts. 
 
As implied above, in addition to litigation resulting from forecast surprise, litigation can 
also result when earnings realizations differ greatly from forecasted earnings. For example, in 
1997, investors filed a class action lawsuit against IVAX Corporation (Case No: 97-559-CIV-
MORENO) for previously issuing erroneous earnings forecasts. While it may be difficult to 
ascertain whether the forecasts were known to be erroneous at the time of issuance, a lawsuit is 
costly to the firm even if the defendant prevails. Thus, managers have a strong incentive to try to 
avoid litigation by strategically choosing the level of forecast precision.  
One strategy for avoiding the litigation possibility is to release only accurate information, 
and accuracy should be decreasing in the forecast horizon. Consistent with this argument, 
 
10 Consistent with this argument, Francis et al. (1994) report that class action lawsuits tend to be precipitated by 
large sock price drops.  
11
 
Baginski et al. (2002) report that the U.S. firms, which face greater disclosure-related legal 
liability than do Canadian firms, tend to release shorter-term forecasts.  
Another way to reduce litigation exposure resulting from inaccurate news is to release 
imprecise information because the more imprecise the information, the less likely the forecast 
can be construed to be inaccurate. For example, a range forecast is less likely than a point 
forecast to be inaccurate (all else equal) because a range forecast contains more possible 
outcomes and is more likely to include the realization. Similarly, since a forecast with a larger 
range encompasses more possible outcomes, a larger range forecast is more likely to include the 
realization. Thus, because the probability that a forecast may turn out to be inaccurate increases 
as precision increases, managers may choose to make precise forecasts only when they have a 
high degree of confidence in the accuracy of their forecasts, and may choose to make less precise 
forecasts when their expected accuracy is lower (King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990). Consistent 
with this argument, Baginski et al. (2002) report that U.S. firms, which face stronger legal 
liability, tend to issue more imprecise forecasts than do Canadian firms. Moreover, Francis et al. 
(1994) report that 28 out of 45 litigations in their sample are due to misleading earnings forecasts 
or preemptive earnings disclosures. Therefore, managers have incentives to take into account the 
expected forecast error and to vary the precision of their forecasts to avoid issuing inaccurate 
forecasts (Bamber and Cheon 1998). However, the earnings realization may not occur until long 
after the forecast. Accordingly, while managers cannot know the future earnings realization with 
certainty, they likely form expectations of future earnings, as well as expectations about the 
precision of their estimates. Because of this, we expect managers to issue less precise forecasts 
the greater the expected forecast error, and we posit that the realized (ex post) forecast error is a 
suitable empirical proxy for this expected forecast error.    
12
 
H3a: Forecast precision is negatively related to the forecast error. 
U.S. firms have an asymmetric litigation loss function in the sense that they are more 
likely to be sued when they have negative returns or a large negative earnings surprise at their 
earnings announcements (Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995, Field et al. 2005). This 
asymmetric loss function may induce firms to issue less optimistic or more pessimistic forecasts 
than they would in the absence of litigation concerns (Choi and Ziebart 2004).  For example, 
Francis et al. (1994) show that shareholder litigation plaintiffs hardly allege pessimistic 
management forecasts or failure to disclose favorable earnings news. 
When managers consider the expected forecast error in the choice of forecast precision, 
they may concern about this asymmetric loss function. That is, they may concern more about 
possible negative forecast errors than positive forecast errors. When managers face some 
uncertainties to attain their forecasts, an alternative way to avoid possible resultant litigation loss 
is to issue more imprecise forecasts because more imprecise forecasts are less likely to be 
inaccurate in ex post basis. Therefore, when managers’ expected forecast errors are negative, we 
predict that they are more likely to make imprecise forecasts (compared with when expected 
forecast errors are positive) in order to decrease legal liability exposure. As a result, we expect 
that the relation between forecast errors and forecast precision is stronger for forecasts with 
negative errors than forecasts with positive errors. 
H4a: The negative relationship between forecast precision and forecast error is stronger 
when forecast errors are negative than when they are positive. 
 
In summary, we expect that forecast precision will be inversely related to the magnitude 
of the forecast surprise and to the magnitude of the forecast error, and that the inverse 
relationships will be stronger for bad news forecasts and for forecasts with negative errors,  
13
 
                                                
respectively. Moreover, we expect these relationships to hold even after controlling for factors 




3.1. Sample Selection and Distributions   
  We obtained management forecasts of annual earnings per share (EPS) for the period 
1995 to 2004 inclusive from First Call. The First Call database includes both qualitative and 
quantitative management forecasts of earnings, and it has been widely used in the extant 
management forecast literature. This yielded 27,841 management forecast observations. To 
minimize possible confounding effects when multiple forecasts were made on the same date (i.e., 
when forecasts for multiple fiscal periods were made on the same date), we eliminated 5,764 
observations containing multiple forecasts. Because we need a measure of extant expectations to 
calculate the forecast surprise, and because we need actual earnings to calculate the subsequent 
earnings surprise, we removed an additional 3,053 forecasts with either no preceding analyst 
consensus forecast available for the corresponding fiscal year or no actual earnings in the First 
Call database. To remove forecasts which may have been erroneously added to the database after 
the actual earnings release, we further deleted 56 forecasts made after 110 calendar days from 
fiscal year-end.
11  Finally, we removed forecasts for which we were unable to obtain the 
requisite data for our analyses on COMPUSTAT (1,582 observations) or CRSP (514 
 
11 The cut-off of 110 days prior is based on Baginski and Hassell (1997), where the maximum number of calendar 
days between the forecast and period-end, for their sample of 922 annual management forecasts, is 110. Removing 
this restriction does not materially affect our results.    
14
 
observations). Our final sample is comprised of 16,872 management forecast observations made 
by 2,735 firms. Table 1 summarizes our sample selection procedure. 
Insert <Table 1> Sample Selection about here 
 Descriptive  statistics,  by  year and overall, regarding the number and percentage of 
sample observations with each type of management forecast (i.e., point, range, and qualitative) 
are provided in Table 2, Panel A. Clearly, the number of management forecasts is increasing 
substantially over time, as is the number of each type of management forecast. Point and range 
forecasts are more common than are qualitative forecasts. Furthermore, the proportion of 
forecasts that are point forecasts (the most specific of forms) is declining over time, from a high 
of 49.4 percent in 1995 to a low of 11.7 percent in 2004, while the proportion of forecasts that 
are range forecasts is generally increasing over time, from 42.1 percent in 1995 to 82.3 percent in 
2004 (with a low of 30 percent in 1997). This tendency could be related to stringent legal 
liability related to the disclosure for which U.S. firms face. Interestingly, the proportion of 
qualitative forecasts increased from 8.5 percent in 1995 to a high of 36 percent in 1999, and then 
declined to 6 percent in 2004. 
Insert < Table 2> Sample Distributions about here 
In Table 2, Panel B, we provide descriptive data regarding whether those firms making 
multiple forecasts during our sample period issue multiple types of forecasts with different 
precision. That is, we provide evidence regarding whether the forecast type is ‘sticky.’ We find 
that the number of types of forecasts issued increases as the number of forecasts issued increase, 
confirming that firms issue forecasts with different precision at different points in time. For 
example, for the 379 firms issuing two forecasts during the sample period, 54.1 percent (205 
firms) issued forecasts with the same precision both times, while 45.9 percent (174 firms) issued  
15
 
                                                
forecasts with different precision. Furthermore, as the number of forecasts issued increases, 
managers issue multiple types more frequently. At the extreme (when 15 or more forecasts are 
issued), 55.9 percent of firms issued all three types of forecasts (point, range, and qualitative).  
  We next stratify the total sample of observations into either good news or bad news 
observations and test whether the sign of the news is related to the forecast precision. Following 
Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Bamber and Cheon (1998), Table 2, Panel C classifies as good 
(bad) news observations with a cumulative abnormal return greater (less) than zero. The 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is measured as the summation of the market-adjusted daily 
returns over the three-day window centered on the management forecast issue date, using 
standard market model procedures. Here, we find that managers are more likely to issue a range 
forecast regardless of the sign of news (good or bad). The preponderance of point forecasts is 
about the same across both good news and bad news (22.8 percent for good news and 21.4 
percent for bad news). Similarly, the proportion of qualitative forecasts is 11.3 percent for good 
news and 12.9 percent for bad news. 
  Next, we classify point and range forecasts by the sign of the forecast surprise in Table 2, 
Panel D. We calculate the unexpected forecast (UF) as ((management forecast – median analyst 
forecast) scaled by stock price).
12 Consistent with prior studies (including Bamber and Cheon 
1998, and Baginski, Hassell, and Kimbrough 2004), we classify the observation as good news if 
UF is greater than or equal to zero, and classify the observation as bad news otherwise. When 
considering range forecasts, we use the midpoint of the range as the management forecast. 
Because no meaningful midpoint can be calculated from the qualitative forecasts, we focus only 
 
12 Although not necessary for good/bad news classification purposes, we divide the forecast surprise (numerator) by 
stock price two days before the management forecast (denominator) because we label the ratio UF in subsequent 
analyses.    
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on point and range forecasts for this analysis. Accordingly, the number of observations falls from 
16,872 in Panel C to 14,831 in Panel D as reported in rightmost column – bottom row of the 
table. Once again, we find that managers are more likely to issue a range forecast, but the 
proportion differs depending upon whether the forecast is good or bad news. Specifically, when 
the news is good, 28.7 percent of forecasts are point forecasts and 71.3 percent are range 
forecasts. However, when the news is bad news, only 18.7 percent of forecasts are point 
forecasts and 81.3 percent are range forecasts.   
We test whether the proportions based on forecast precision are independent of the sign 
of news. When we use the CAR to classify news (in Panel C), the Chi-square statistic for 
independence is 13.00 (p-value = 0.0015, df = 2), and when we use UF to classify news (in Panel 
D), the Chi-square statistic for independence is 184.50 (p-value < 0.0001, df = 1). This indicates 
that the difference in proportion between the sign of news is significant, suggesting that the 
choice of precision is related to the sign of news. 
 
3.2. Empirical Models 
  To examine hypotheses H1 and H2, we use the following equation, Eq. (1), which models 
the relationship between forecast precision, forecast surprise, and a set of control variables. 
 
PRECISION = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 ABS_CAR (or ABS_UF)                            (1) 
                       + b3 BAD_CAR*ABS_CAR (or BAD_UF*ABS_UF) + b4 HORIZON + b5 SDRES  
                       + b6 CON_OWN + b7 NANAL + b8 MB + b9 SIZE + b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
where:  
PRECISION  =  the precision of the management forecast, measured by either 




PRECISION1  =  2 for point forecasts, 1 for range forecasts, and 0 for qualitative 
statements; 
 
PRECISION2  =  0 for point forecasts, and (-absolute value of [the upper limit 
minus the lower limit of the range forecast]), deflated by the 
share price at day –2) for range forecasts; 
 
CAR  =  the summation of market-adjusted returns over the three-day 
window centered on the forecast announcement date; 
 
UF  =  the forecast surprise, measured by the management forecast 
minus the most recent median analyst forecast preceding the 
management forecast, deflated by the share price at day –2; 
 
BAD_CAR  = 1  if  CAR < 0 and 0 otherwise; 
 
BAD_UF  = 1  if  UF < 0 and 0 otherwise; 
 
ABS_CAR  =  the absolute value of CAR; 
 
ABS_UF  =  the absolute value of UF; 
 
HORIZON  =  the forecast horizon, measured by the natural logarithm of the 
number of calendar days between forecast and end of the fiscal 
year to which the forecast pertains plus 111 days; 
 
SDRES  =  the standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over 
a 200-day period ending 31 trading days before the management 
forecast announcement; 
 
CON_OWN  =  concentrated ownership, measured by one minus the number of 
common shareholders over the number of common shares 
outstanding; 
 
NANAL   =  the natural logarithm of the number of First Call analysts 
following the firm during the month immediately preceding the 
management forecast; 
 
MB  =  the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at 
the beginning of the fiscal year; 
 
SIZE  =  the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at 




                                                
CONC  =  the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the 
sales of the top-five firms in the firm’s two digit SIC code 
industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry 
during the year; 
 
YEAR  =  the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 
= 1996, … , 10 = 2004). 
 
We measure the precision of the forecasts using either PRECISION1 or PRECISION2. 
PRECISION1 is a discrete variable and tests using this dependent measure include all three 
forecast types (point, range, and qualitative), while PRECISION2 is a continuous variable and 
tests using this dependent measure include only point and range forecasts. The magnitude of the 
forecast surprise is measured by ABS_CAR and by ABS_UF,
13 and the sign of the forecast 
surprise is measured by BAD_CAR and BAD_UF, respectively.  
Among the control variables, we expect HORIZON and SDRES to be negative because 
forecasts made later in the period should be subject to less earnings uncertainty (and thus, should 
be more precise), and because managers’ beliefs should be more precise the lower the variability 
in expected earnings (Baginski and Hassell 1997). We expect CON_OWN to be negative because 
firms may face greater monitoring and greater litigation threats when ownership is more 
concentrated (Ashbaugh, Collins, and Kinney 2005), leading managers to issue less precise 
forecasts (Bamber and Cheon 1998). We use analyst following (NANAL) to proxy for private 
information production (Bhushan 1989) and/or the informativeness of firm disclosures (Lang and 
Lundholm 1996), and expect firms with greater analyst following to issue more precise forecasts. 
We expect growth potential (MB) to be positive because high growth firms have stronger 
incentives to avoid negative earnings surprises (Skinner and Sloan 2002) and more precise 
 
13 To measure the magnitude of the surprise, we also use the rank of the variable rather than the continuous variable. 
Because the results are almost identical, we do not separately report the results using the rank variable for the 
simplicity purpose.  
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forecasts could be used to adjust the market’s expectation to beatable level more directly. With 
respect to SIZE, we expect management forecast precision to be decreasing in the amount of 
public information (Baginski and Hassell 1997). In contrast, it is possible that large firms who 
have stronger incentive to build disclosure reputation could issue more precise forecasts (e.g., 
King 1996). As a result, it is difficult to predict the exact sign of the coefficient on SIZE. Finally, 
we expect firms with large proprietary costs related to growth opportunities or concentrated 
product-markets (CONC) to issue less precise forecasts (Bamber and Cheon 1998). The yearly 
dummy variable (YEAR) is included in the equation to control for the time-series trend among 
the forecasts. 
To test hypotheses H3 and H4, we extend Eq. (1) as follows: 
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 ABS_CAR (or ABS_UF)       (2) 
                       + b3 BAD_CAR*ABS_CAR (or BAD_UF*ABS_UF) + b4 FERROR  
            + b5 DNFE* FERROR + b6 HORIZON + b7 SDRES + b8 CON_OWN  
                       + b9 NANAL + b10 MB + b11 SIZE  + b12 CONC + b13 YEAR + ε 
 
Eq. (2) adds two additional variables of interest ─ FERROR and DNFE*FERROR ─ to 
Eq. (1). We use the ex post accuracy of the forecasts, FERROR (measured by the absolute value 
of the difference between the actual ex post earnings per share and management forecast, 
deflated by stock price at day -2), to proxy for management’s expected forecast error (i.e., 
management’s expectation of the difference between the management forecast and the future 
EPS). DNFE is an indicator variable set to 1 if the forecast error is negative (i.e., actual ex post 
earnings per share is smaller than the management forecast or the management forecast is 
pessimistic), and 0 otherwise. 
In Table 3, we report descriptive statistics for the variables we use in our analyses. The 
statistics are similar to those reported in prior studies.  Although we calculate the HORIZON 
variable with logged value, we report the value before imposing log function in order to show  
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readers clear picture on the forecast horizon. Thus, the value of HORIZON in Table 3 is the 
actual number of calendar days between forecast announcement and fiscal year-end date plus 
111 days. Note that we add 111 days because some forecasts are announced after the fiscal year-
end date. For example, if a forecast is announced at January 10, which is 10 days after the end of 
fiscal year-end date, the variable is -10 + 111 = 101. In contrast, if the forecast is announced 10 
days before the fiscal year-end date, the forecast horizon becomes 121 days (10 + 111 = 121).
14   
Insert <Table 3> Descriptive Statistics about here 
  Although it is not separately tabulated for the simplicity purpose, we check the 
correlations among variables used in the study. The PRECISION1 and PRECISION2 are 
significantly correlated with Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.3376 (p < 0.001). The 
correlation between ABS_UF and FERROR is 0.7531 (p < 0.001), although the correlation 
between ABS_CAR and FERROR is relatively low (r = 0.0832). Among control variables, only 
the correlations between SDRES and SIZE (r = -0.4603) and between NANAL and SIZE (r = 




4. Empirical Results 
Before testing our hypotheses related to forecast surprise and forecast error, we first 
attempt to replicate the main results of Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Bamber and Cheon 
(1998) using our sample. Recall that prior research finds at best weak evidence that managers are 
 
14 To avoid confusion, we re-perform all the analyses reported in this study after removing 792 observations which 
released the forecasts after the date of the fiscal year-end but before the 110 days cut-off date. The results tabulated 
in this study do not change qualitatively at all and all the inferences remain the same.  
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significantly more (less) likely to issue more precise forecasts when news is good (bad) 
(Baginski and Hassell 1997, Bamber and Cheon 1998). Our study differs from these prior studies 
in two important ways. First, our sample size is much larger, giving us greater power to detect a 
relation if one does, in fact, exist. Second, our sample is drawn from a more recent period where 
management’s concerns over litigation may be greater. Here, we use a simplified version of Eq. 
(1), similar to the model used in those studies. 
PRECISION1 = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 HORIZON + b3 SDRES + b4 CON_OWN      (3) 
                       + b5 NANAL + b6 MB + b7 SIZE + b8 CONC + b9 YEAR + ε 
 
Using Eq. (3), we examine whether the coefficients on BAD_CAR and/or BAD_UF are 
significantly negative. We report the results in Table 4.
15  
Insert <Table 4> Replication of Cross-sectional Regression Tests of the Determinants  
of Management Forecast Precision about here 
 
In these analyses, we present three models. The first model includes all sample 
observations. Here, we conduct an ordered-response logistic analysis where the dependent 
variable (PRECISION1) is set to 2 if the forecast is a point forecast, 1 if the forecast is a range 
forecast, and 0 if the forecast is a qualitative forecast. The second and third models include only 
point and range forecasts. Here, we conduct logistic analysis where the dependent variable 
(PRECISION1) is set to 1 if the forecast is a point forecast, and 0 if the forecast is a range 
forecast. In model 2 (3), we sort news into good versus bad news by the sign of the CAR (UF) so 
that our variable of interest, BAD_CAR (BAD_UF), is set to 1 if CAR (UF) is less than 0, and 0 
 
15 Note that the Tables 4 and 6 do not include intercept because we perform ordered-logit analyses for the results in 
those two tables. The other tables include the intercept variable because we perform simple logit analyses for the 
results in the other tables.  
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otherwise.
16 We run our analyses using a clustering procedure that accounts for serial 
dependence across years for a given firm.   
Results on the indicator variables (BAD_CAR and BAD_UF) support the argument of 
Baginski and Hassell (1997) and Bamber and Cheon (1998). Specifically, we find that the 
coefficients on BAD_CAR and BAD_UF are negative and statistically significant, revealing that 
managers do issue more precise forecasts when news is good, and issue less precise forecasts 
when news is bad. That is, bad news forecasts are less precise while good news forecasts are 
more precise. Our results on the other variables are generally consistent with prior studies and 
with expectations. Specifically, we find some evidence that managers issue more precise 
forecasts when expected earnings uncertainty (SDRES) is smaller. We also find some evidence 
that firms with larger analyst following (NANAL) issue more precise forecasts. Furthermore, 
consistent with Bamber and Cheon (1998), we are unable to document the predicted association 
between forecast precision and ownership concentration (CON_OWN), or growth opportunities 
(MB). Note that the coefficient on SIZE (HORIZON) is negative (positive) but not significant in 
model 1 when we use full sample, whereas the coefficient is positive (negative) and significant at 
1% level in models 2 and 3 when we restrict the sample to point and range forecasts only.
17 
These results suggest that the firm size is not related to the choice between qualitative statement, 
range forecast, or point forecasts, but large firms tend to release forecasts with wider range than 
they do forecasts with shorter range or point forecasts when we further investigate the choice 
only for point and range forecasts. Similarly, forecast horizon is not related to the choice 
between different types of forecasts, but managers tend to release longer-term forecasts with 
 
16 Note that there are no observations for which CAR = 0. 
17 The same findings for the coefficients on SIZE and HORIZON are documented in all the subsequent analyses 
reported in Tables 6, 7, and 8.  
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wider range than they do forecasts with shorter range or point forecasts when we restrict the 
sample to point and range forecasts only. However, contrary to results in Bamber and Cheon 
(1998), we find that forecast precision has declined over time (YEAR), but this could be due to 
our different sample selection criteria and time periods.
18 Finally, unlike Bamber and Cheon 
(1998), we do not find that firms in highly concentrated product markets (CONC) issue less 
precise forecasts.  
  In hypothesis H1, we posit that managers issue less precise forecasts when forecast 
surprise is greater, and in H3, we posit that managers issue less precise forecasts when 
(expected) forecast errors are greater. In Table 5, we provide preliminary analyses supporting 
these assertions. Here, we sort our observations into forecast type groups (point, range, and 
qualitative) and calculate the mean and median forecast surprise (Panel A) and forecast error 
(Panel B) for each group. We find mixed support that both the forecast surprise and the forecast 
error are linked to the choice of forecast precision. For example, in Panel A, we conduct the 
analysis using both measures of forecast surprise and find that forecast surprise is decreasing in 
forecast precision. Specifically, using ABS_CAR (ABS_UF) to measure forecast surprise, we find 
that the mean (median) forecast surprise for point forecasts is 0.0624 (0.0383), while the mean 
(median) forecast surprise for range forecasts is 0.0644 (0.0381), and forecast surprise is largest 
for qualitative forecasts (mean = 0.0779 and median = 0.0475). Tests of differences in means 
(medians) of the forecast surprise for point and qualitative forecasts are highly significant (at p < 
0.001). Using ABS_UF to measure forecast surprise, we find a similar relationship between 
 
18 Specifically, Bamber and Cheon (1998) require that sample firms have at least eight years of analyst disclosure 
ratings available from the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) over the period 1981 to 
1991. Because of this, we expect that their sample firms are likely larger than ours, on average.  
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forecast surprise and forecast precision – forecasts are more precise the smaller the forecast 
surprise.  
  In Panel B, we report the mean and median forecast errors (FERROR) for the point and 
range forecasts. Consistent with our expectations, the mean (median) forecast error increases as 
forecast precision declines. Specifically, the mean and median forecast error are smallest for 
point forecasts, followed by small range forecasts, and then by large range forecasts.
19 Again, 
differences are highly significant (at p < 0.001). These findings suggest that managers’ 
expectations of ex post accuracy may influence their choice of forecast precision. We test this 
directly in subsequent analyses, reported in Table 8. 
Insert <Table 5> Univariate Analyses of the Association between Forecast Surprise and 
Forecast Precision, and between Forecast Error and Forecast Precision about here 
  
In Table 6, we further test hypotheses H1 and H2, using Eq. (1). Specifically, we use 
ordered-response logistic analysis to examine the relationship between management forecast 
precision and the magnitude of the forecast surprise. The dependent variable is PRECISION1 and 
the independent variable of interest is ABS_CAR or ABS_UF, which is the absolute value of the 
magnitude of CAR or UF, respectively.
20 The indicator variables BAD_CAR and BAD_UF are 
set to 1 if the forecast is bad news, and 0 otherwise. We add those variables included in prior 
studies (Baginski and Hassell 1997, Bamber and Cheon 1998) to control for other factors that 
might influence the choice of forecast precision, and we consider (1) all types of precision (i.e., 
point, range, and qualitative forecasts) and (2) point and range forecasts only. We also include an 
interaction that considers both the sign of the forecast surprise and its magnitude.  
 
19 Here, we define small range forecasts as those where the size of the range (i.e., upper limit - lower limit) is smaller 
than $0.06, where $0.06 is the median range size. 
20 Recall that ABS_CAR and ABS_UF are measures of forecast surprise. ABS_CAR is based on the market reaction at 
the time of the forecast while ABS_UF is based on the difference between the forecast and the most recent median 
analyst forecast.  
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We present the results from six models. The first two models include all forecasts and 
classify bad versus good news based on CAR. The next four models include only point and range 
forecasts and classify news based on CAR (models 3 and 4) or on UF (models 5 and 6). All 
models include the sign of the news and the magnitude of the forecast surprise, and three of the 
models (models 2, 4 and 6) interact these variables.
21  
In all models, the magnitude of the forecast surprise (ABS_CAR and ABS_UF) is 
significantly negative, confirming that as forecast surprise increases, forecasts become more 
imprecise, consistent with H1. Moreover, the interaction terms, BAD_CAR* ABS_CAR and 
BAD_UF*ABS_UF are significantly negative, revealing that the negative association between 
forecast precision and forecast surprise is stronger for bad news, consistent with H2. Results for 
the control variables are largely consistent with those in Table 4.
22
Insert <Table 6> The Association between Forecast Precision and the Magnitude of 
Forecast Surprise Considering Good versus Bad News about here 
 
In Table 7, we report the results using Eq. (2), restricting the sample to only point and 
range forecasts. Here, we measure precision as a continuous variable rather than as a discrete 
variable. This allows us to examine whether the size of the range (for range forecasts) is 
associated with forecast surprise. In these analyses, PRECISION2 is set to 0 for point forecasts, 
and for range forecasts, PRECISION2 equals [(-absolute value of (upper limit – lower limit of 
the range forecast)) deflated by the share price at day –2]. Thus, if a range forecast has a very 
narrow range, the value of PRECISION2 is close to 0. In contrast, if a range forecast has a very 
 
21 Rather than combining both good and bad news samples, we divide the sample and perform regressions with good 
and bad news sub-samples separately. Because all the results in Tables 6, 7, and 8 are qualitatively similar and 
inferences remain the same, we do not separately report them for the simplicity purpose. 
22 We also repeat similar analyses with Eq. (1) as well as all the other regression analyses performed in this study 
but after removing two dummy variables on the sign of the news, i.e., BAD_CAR and BAD_UF variables. Because 




wide range, the value of PRECISION2 is a much smaller than 0. In essence, Table 7 replicates 
the analyses reported in Table 6 but considers the size of the range for range forecasts.  
Again, we run various models, classifying good versus bad news using CAR (models 1 
and 2) and UF (models 3 and 4), and we consider both the sign and the magnitude of the forecast 
surprise, as well as the interaction of the sign and magnitude. The results are consistent across 
Tables 6 and 7; as the magnitude of the forecast surprise increases, forecasts become less precise 
(i.e., the coefficients on ABS_CAR and ABS_UF are significantly negative). This imprecision is 
manifested in management moving from making a point forecast, to a range forecast with a small 
range, and then to a range forecast with a large range as the forecast surprise increases. The 
results also indicate that this effect is more pronounced for bad news forecasts than for good 
news forecasts (i.e., the coefficients on the interaction variables, BAD_CAR*ABS_CAR and 
BAD_UF*ABS_UF, are significantly negative). 
Insert <Table 7> The Association between Forecast Precision and Forecast Surprise, 
and between Forecast Precision and Forecast Error, Considering Good versus Bad 
News about here 
 
  Finally, in Table 8, we report the results from extending our analyses by focusing on 
point and range forecasts and including the actual ex post forecast error. Recall that we 
hypothesize that management’s decision regarding forecast precision is related to both the 
forecast surprise and management’s expectation of the eventual forecast error. Specifically, we 
expect that larger forecast surprises and larger expected forecast errors will be associated with 
less precise forecasts. Because we are unable to model management’s expectation of the eventual 
forecast error (i.e., the forecast error that will become known only when actual earnings are 
announced), we use the actual ex post forecast error as our proxy for the expected forecast error. 
Using the ex post forecast error may induce measurement error (because the ex post forecast  
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error should be larger than management’s expectation of the forecast error at times, and should 
be smaller than management’s expectation of the forecast error at other times). However, 
assuming that this measurement error is normally distributed with a mean of zero, the bias is 
against our observing statistical significance when we use the ex post actual forecast error as a 
proxy for management’s expectation of the forecast error. 
  Results from this analysis, reported in Table 8, are primarily consistent with those 
reported in Table 7. Specifically, forecast precision is negatively associated with forecast 
surprise, and this effect is more pronounced for bad news forecasts than for good news forecasts. 
However, results on the forecast error are mixed. When we use CAR to classify the forecasts as 
good or bad news (i.e., in models 1 and 2), the coefficient on the forecast error (FERROR) is 
significantly negative, supporting our theory that management considers the expected forecast 
error when choosing the level of forecast precision, and makes less precise forecasts the larger 
the expected forecast error. In addition, this effect is more pronounced when the expected 
forecast error is negative as evidenced by the significantly negative coefficient on 
DNFE*FERROR (in model 2). However, when we use UF to classify forecasts as good or bad 
news (i.e., in models 3 and 4), the coefficient on the forecast error is not significantly different 
from zero, but for bad news forecast errors, the coefficient (on DNFE*FERROR) is again 
significantly negative, suggesting that bad news forecasts are less precise the larger the expected 
forecast error. Overall, these results suggest that management’s decision regarding forecast 
precision is generally affected by both the forecast surprise and the forecast error, especially 
when the forecast error is negative. These findings support H4 and, to a lesser extent, H3.   
Insert <Table 8> The Association between Forecast Precision and the Magnitude of 




  The insignificant coefficients on FERROR reported in models 3 and 4 of Table 8 could be 
due to high correlation between FERROR and ABS_UF (r = 0.7531) as explained before. In 
contrast, the coefficients on FERROR are significant when we use ABS_CAR rather than 
ABS_UF in models 1 and 2. Note that the correlation between FERROR and ABS_CAR is not 
that high (0.0832) as explained before. These findings suggest the possibility of multicolinearity 
affecting the results in models 3 and 4. To solve this problem, we use the following Eq. (4) and 
reperform the analyses. The Eq. (4), which does not contain any variables related to ABS_CAR or 
ABS_UF, is the shortened version of Eq. (3).  
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 FERROR + b2 DNFE* FERROR + b3 HORIZON + b4 SDRES              (4) 
+ b5 CON_OWN + b6 NANAL + b7 MB + b8 SIZE + b9 CONC + b10 YEAR + ε 
 
 
  The untabulated results reveal that both b1 and b2 are highly significant. For example, the 
coefficient on FERROR is -2.017 (p < 0.001) and that on DNFE*FERROR is -8.631 (p < 0.001), 
supporting the H3 and H4, respectively.  
 
 5. Conclusions  
  In this study, we reexamine whether the sign of news (good versus bad) is associated with 
the precision of management earnings forecasts. As hypothesized (but not supported) in prior 
studies, we provide strong evidence that forecast precision (i.e., point, range, or qualitative) is 
related to the sign of news. Specifically, we find that bad news forecasts are less precise than are 
good news forecasts. We also show that the precision of range forecasts is related to the type of 
news and to the magnitude of the forecast surprise. Specifically, the forecasts become less 
precise or ranges (for range forecasts) become larger the greater the forecast surprise, and the 
relation is stronger for the bad news than good news forecasts. Furthermore, we find support for  
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our theory that management considers the expected sign and magnitude of forecast error when 
choosing the level of forecast precision, even after controlling for the forecast surprise. In 
addition, the relation between forecast precision and forecast error is greater when the forecast 
exceeds actual ex post earnings. We posit that this strategic behavior may be related to litigation 
concerns. In conclusion, the findings in our study are consistent with management acting 
strategically when issuing forecasts. 
  In developing policies to encourage managers to issue earnings guidance, it is important 
for policy makers to consider this strategic behavior. For example, over the last ten years, we 
observe a significant shift away from point forecasts, toward range forecasts. When one 
considers that the precision of range forecasts also varies by the type of news (good versus bad), 
the magnitude of the forecast surprise, and both the type and magnitude of the forecast error, one 
realizes that precision may have deteriorated, and the ‘quality’ of information may have declined 
even though more management forecasts are issued. Thus, further research to understand the 
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Annual earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from the First Call database from 1995 
to 2004 inclusive  27,841 
   
(-) Observations with forecasts issued for more than one period   (5,764) 
   
(-) Forecasts missing a preceding consensus analyst forecast or a corresponding 
     actual earnings in the First Call  (3,053) 
   
(-) Forecasts made within 110 days of the fiscal-year end   (56) 
   
(-) Forecasts missing COMPUSTAT data  (1,582) 
   
(-) Forecasts missing CRSP data  (514) 
   
Number of management forecasts in the final sample  16,872 
   
Number of firms in final sample  2,735 








Panel A: Precision of Management Forecasts by Forecast Year  
  - Number and (Percentage)  
 Point  Range  Qualitative  Total 




























































































Table 2 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel B: Forecast Types as a Function of Forecasting Frequency - Frequency and 
(Percentage)  
 
Number (Percentage) of forecast types 
Number of forecasts  
for a given firm 
Number 
[Percentage]  
of firms  1 2 3 
1  813 
[29.7] 
813 
(100.0)    





(45.9)   















































A firm may issue forecasts for a specific fiscal period at different points in time. 
A firm may issue forecasts for multiple fiscal periods at a given point in time.  
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
 
Panel C: Precision of Management Forecast by the Sign of News (Good or Bad) where the 
Sign is Measured based on the Sign of CAR - Frequency and (Percentage)  
 
Forecast Type  Point  Range Qualitative  Total 
















Total   3,724 (22.1)  11,107 (65.8)  2,041 (12.1)  16,872 (100.0) 
 




Panel D: Precision of Management Forecast by the Sign of News (Good or Bad) where the 
Sign is Measured based on the Sign of Forecast Surprise (UF) - Frequency and 
(Percentage)  
 
Forecast Type  Point  Range  Total 
Good News    2,727 (28.7)  6,762 (71.3)   9,489 (100.0) 
Bad News      997 (18.7)  4,345 (81.3)  5,342 (100.0) 
Total   3,724 (25.1)  11,107 (74.9)  14,831 (100.0) 
 
Note: We classify forecasts as good news if forecast surprise ((management forecast - median analyst forecast) / 






 n  Mean  Std.  Dev.  5%  Median  95% 
CAR  16,872  -0.0095 0.1045  -0.1875 -0.0001 0.1280 
ABS_CAR  16,872   0.0656  0.0819 0.0031 0.0391 0.2162 
BAD_CAR  16,872   0.5049  0.5000 0  1  1 
UF  14,831    0.0180  0.0642 -0.0171  0.0004 0.1060 
ABS_UF  14,831    0.0254  0.0617 0  0.0031 0.1123 
BAD_UF  14,831   0.3602  0.4801 0  0  1 
FERROR  14,831   0.0325  0.0736 0.0002 0.0081 0.1283 
HORIZON  16,872    204.0  195.5 4.0  210.0 377.0 
SDRES  16,872    0.0271  0.0141 0.0107 0.0239 0.0541 
CON_OWN  16,872   0.8103  0.4183 0.3522 0.9222 0.9957 
NANAL  16,872    8.623  6.587 1.000 7.000 22.000 
MB  16,872    3.115  11.689  0.719 2.329 10.031 
SIZE  16,872   8,245  29,293  77  1,132  33,267 
CONC  16,872    0.422  0.168 0.185 0.384 0.746 
Notes:  
CAR   = the summation of market-adjusted daily returns over the three-day window centered on the   
           management forecast date using standard market model procedures; 
ABS_CAR     = the absolute value of CAR; 
BAD_CAR    = an indicator variable which equals one if CAR < 0 and zero if CAR > 0; 
UF         = unexpected management forecast measured by the management forecast minus the most recent  
                       median analyst forecast preceding the management forecast, deflated by stock price at day -2; 
ABS_UF       = absolute value of UF; 
BAD_UF     = an indicator variable which equals one if UF < 0 and zero if UF ≥ 0; 
FERROR      = unsigned forecast error measured by the absolute value of (management forecast minus the 
actual earnings per share, deflated by stock at day -2); 
HORIZON    = the number of calendar days between the forecast and the end of fiscal year to which the 
forecast pertains plus 111 days; 
SDRES         = standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over a 200-day period, ending 31  
                  trading days before the management forecast; 
CON_OWN   = concentrated ownership measured by one minus the number of common shareholders over the  
                         number of common shares outstanding; 
NANAL  = the number of First Call analysts following for the month immediately preceding the 
management forecast; 
MB  = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year; 
SIZE         = the market value of common equity at the beginning of the forecast fiscal year (in millions); 
CONC        = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the sales of the top-five firms in  




Replication of Cross-sectional Regression Tests of the Determinants of Management 
Forecast Precision  
 
PRECISION1 = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 HORIZON + b3 SDRES + b4 CON_OWN  
                       + b5 NANAL + b6 MB + b7 SIZE + b8 CONC+ b9 YEAR + ε 
 
All Forecasts  Point and Range Forecasts Only 
Variable  Expected 
Sign 
Model 1  Model 2   Model 3 






BAD_UF  (-)         -         -  -0.618 
(0.000)
***







































































2    0.013   0.147   0.164 
 
Notes:  
Model 1 is the ordered-response logit analysis of management forecast precision which equals two for point 
forecasts, one for range forecasts, and zero for qualitative forecasts.  Model 2 and 3 are the binary logit analysis of 
management forecast precision which equals one for point forecasts and zero for range forecasts. A positive 
coefficient in all models is associated with more precise (i.e., specific) forecasts.  Intercepts are not reported in the 
table due to parsimonity. 
BAD_CAR    = an indicator variable which equals one if CAR < 0 and zero if CAR > 0; 
BAD_UF      = an indicator variable which equals one if UF < 0 and zero if UF ≥ 0; 
HORIZON   = management forecast horizon measured as the natural logarithm of the number of calendar days 
between the forecast and the end of fiscal year to which the forecast pertains plus 111 days; 
SDRES         = standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over a 200-day period, ending 31  
                  trading days before the management forecast;  
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CON_OWN   = concentrated ownership measured by one minus the number of common shareholders over the  
                         number of common shares outstanding; 
NANAL   = the natural logarithm of the number of First Call analysts following for the month immediately 
preceding the management forecast; 
MB  = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year; 
SIZE         = the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
 fiscal year (in millions); 
CONC         = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the sales of the top-five firms in  
   the two digit SIC industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry during the year. 
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1= 1995, 2=1996, … , 10=2004).  
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence 
across years of a given firm. Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. 





Univariate Analyses of the Association between Forecast Surprise and Forecast Precision, 
and between Forecast Error and Forecast Precision 
 




Mean Median mean median 
Point 0.0624  0.0383  0.0184  0.0021 
Total 0.0644  0.0381  0.0277  0.0035 
Small range  0.0719  0.0444  0.0265  0.0027  Range 
Large range  0.0572  0.0330  0.0288  0.0044 
Qualitative 0.0779  0.0475  -  - 
Mean (median)  
difference test 















Point 0.0257  0.0081 
Total 0.0346  0.0081 
Small range  0.0323  0.0056  Range 
Large range  0.0368  0.0111 
Mean (median)  
difference test 







ABS_CAR     = the absolute value of (the summation of market-adjusted daily returns over the three-day  
            window centered on the management forecast date using standard market model  
                         procedures); 
ABS_UF       = the absolute value of (unexpected management forecast measured by the management               
                        forecast minus the most recent median analyst forecast preceding the management forecast,  
                        deflated by stock price at day -2); 
FERROR     =  unsigned forecast error measured by the absolute value of (management forecast minus the  
                        actual earnings per share, deflated by stock at day -2). 
Small ranges are defined as those range forecasts where the size of the range (i.e. upper limit – lower limit) is 
smaller than $0.06, where $0.06 is the median of range. Large ranges are all other ranges.  
Mean (median) difference tests are performed between point and qualitative forecasts for ABS_CAR, and between 







The Association between Forecast Precision and the Magnitude of Forecast Surprise 
Considering Good versus Bad News 
 
PRECISION1 = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 ABS_CAR (or ABS_UF)  
                       + b3 BAD_CAR*ABS_CAR (or BAD_UF*ABS_UF) + b4 HORIZON + b5 SDRES  
                       + b6 CON_OWN + b7 NANAL + b8 MB + b9 SIZE + b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
 




Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 









(0.905)        -        - 

















*       -        - 







ABS_CAR  (-)        -  -1.432 
(0.002)
***       -  -1.898 
(0.000)
***       -        - 
BAD_UF * 
ABS_UF  (-)        -        -        -        -        -  -0.243 
(0.089)
*

















































































































































Model 1 and 2 are the ordered-response logit analysis of the management forecast precision which equals two for 
point forecasts, one for range forecasts, and zero for qualitative forecasts.  Model 3, 4, 5 and 6 are the binary logit 
analysis of the management forecast precision which equals one for point forecasts, and zero for range forecasts. A 
positive coefficient in all models is associated with more precise (i.e., specific) forecasts.  Intercepts are not reported 
in the table due to parsimonity. 
BAD_CAR    = an indicator variable which equals one if CAR < 0 and zero if CAR > 0; 
BAD_UF      = an indicator variable which equals one if UF < 0 and zero if UF ≥ 0; 
ABS_CAR     = the absolute value of CAR; 
ABS_UF       = the absolute value of UF; 
HORIZON    = management forecast horizon measured as the natural logarithm of the number of calendar days  
between the forecast and the end of fiscal year to which the forecast pertains plus 111 days; 
SDRES       = standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over a 200-day period, ending 31  
                  trading days before the management forecast; 
CON_OWN   = concentrated ownership measured by one minus the number of common shareholders over the  
                         number of common shares outstanding; 
NANAL  = the natural logarithm of the number of First Call analysts following for the month immediately 
preceding the management forecast; 
MB  = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year; 
SIZE   = the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year (in millions); 
CONC         = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the sales of the top-five firms in  
                         the two digit SIC industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry during the year. 
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 = 1996, … , 10 = 2004).  
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence 
across years of a given firm. Two-tailed p-values are presented in the parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (all two-tailed).  
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 Table 7 
The Association between Forecast Precision and the Magnitude of Forecast Surprise 
Considering Good versus Bad News – Further Evidence 
 
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 ABS_CAR (or ABS_UF)  
                       + b3 BAD_CAR*ABS_CAR (or BAD_UF*ABS_UF) + b4 HORIZON + b5 SDRES  
                       + b6 CON_OWN + b7 NANAL + b8 MB + b9 SIZE + b10 CONC + b11 YEAR + ε 
 
 
Variable  Expected 
Sign  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 












BAD_CAR  (-)  -0.015 
(0.236) 
-0.008 
(0.637)       -       - 











*      -       - 







ABS_CAR  (-)        -  -0.176 
(0.061)
*      -       - 
BAD_UF * 
ABS_UF  (-)        -       -       -  -3.621 
(0.007)
***
























































































  n    14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 
























The dependent variable, PRECISION2, is defined as zero for point forecasts and - (negative) size of the range  
(= - abs (upper –lower) of the range), deflated by the share price at day -2, for range forecasts.  All models are 
estimated by OLS. A positive coefficient in all models is associated with more precise forecasts. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. 
BAD_CAR    = an indicator variable which equals one if CAR < 0 and zero if CAR > 0; 
BAD_UF      = an indicator variable which equals one if UF < 0 and zero if UF ≥ 0; 
ABS_CAR     = the absolute value of CAR; 
ABS_UF       = the absolute value of UF; 
HORIZON    = management forecast horizon measured as the natural logarithm of the number of calendar days  
between the forecast and the end of fiscal year to which the forecast pertains plus 111 days; 
SDRES         = standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over a 200-day period, ending 31  
                  trading days before the management forecast; 
CON_OWN   = concentrated ownership measured by one minus the number of common shareholders over the  
                         number of common shares outstanding; 
NANAL  = the natural logarithm of the number of First Call analysts following for the month immediately 
preceding the management forecast; 
MB  = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal; 
SIZE   = the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year (in millions); 
CONC         = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the sales of the top-five firms in  
                         the two digit SIC industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry during the year. 
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 = 1996, … , 10 = 2004).  
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a White (1980) procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity 
and a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years of a given firm. Two-tailed p-values are 
presented in the parentheses. 




The Association between Forecast Precision and Forecast Surprise, and between Forecast 
Precision and Forecast Error, Considering Good versus Bad News  
 
PRECISION2 = b0 + b1 BAD_CAR (or BAD_UF) + b2 ABS_CAR (or ABS_UF)  
                       + b3 BAD_CAR*ABS_CAR (or BAD_UF*ABS_UF) + b4 FERROR + b5 DNFE* FERROR  
                       + b6 HORIZON + b7 SDRES + b8 CON_OWN + b9 NANAL + b10 MB + b11 SIZE  
                       + b12 CONC + b13 YEAR + ε 
 
 
Variable  Expected 
Sign  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 












BAD_CAR  (-)  -0.001 
(0.985) 
-0.001 
(0.959)       -       - 










*      -       - 







ABS_CAR  (-)  -0.056 
(0.123) 
-0.010 
(0.145)       -     - 
BAD_UF * 

















FERROR  (-) -  -8.714 
(0.001)
*** -  -5.893 
(0.007)
***









  0.155 
(0.000)
***
















  0.013 
(0.439) 
  0.009 
(0.571) 






  0.061 
(0.000)
***
  0.056 
(0.000)
***






  0.001 
(0.094)
*
  0.001 
(0.112) 






  0.033 
(0.000)
***
  0.033 
(0.000)
***




  0.059 
(0.310) 
  0.054 
(0.345) 












  N    14,831 14,831 14,831 14,831 






















The dependent variable, PRECISION2, is defined as zero for point forecasts and - (negative) size of the range (= - 
abs (upper –lower) of the range), deflated by the share price at day -2, for range forecasts.  All models are estimated 
by OLS. A positive coefficient in all models is associated with more precise (i.e., specific) forecasts. 
All coefficients are multiplied by 100 for presentation purposes. 
BAD_CAR    = an indicator variable which equals one if CAR < 0 and zero if CAR > 0; 
BAD_UF     = an indicator variable which equals one if UF < 0 and zero if UF ≥ 0; 
ABS_CAR     = the absolute value of CAR; 
ABS_UF       = the absolute value of UF; 
FERROR      = unsigned forecast error measured by the absolute value of (management forecast minus the 
actual earnings per share, deflated by stock at day -2); 
DNFE          = an indicator variable which equals one if signed management forecast error is negative and  
                       zero otherwise; 
HORIZON    = management forecast horizon measured as the natural logarithm of the number of calendar days  
between the forecast and the end of fiscal year to which the forecast pertains plus 111 days; 
SDRES         = standard deviation of market model residuals estimated over a 200-day period, ending 31  
                  trading days before the management forecast; 
CON_OWN   = concentrated ownership measured by one minus the number of common shareholders over the  
                         number of common shares outstanding; 
NANAL  = the natural logarithm of the number of First Call analysts following for the month immediately 
preceding the management forecast; 
MB  = the ratio of market to book value of the firm’s common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year; 
SIZE   = the natural logarithm of the market value of common equity at the beginning of the forecast 
fiscal year (in millions); 
CONC         = the firm’s product-market concentration ratio, measured as the sales of the top-five firms in  
                        the two digit SIC industry in that year, divided by total sales in that industry during the year. 
YEAR is the year in which the management forecast is issued (1 = 1995, 2 = 1996, … , 10 = 2004).  
When estimating the coefficients’ standard errors, we use a White (1980) procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity 
and a clustering procedure that accounts for serial dependence across years of a given firm. Two-tailed p-values are 
presented in the parentheses. 
* Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% (all two-tailed). 
 
 